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1 Comparisons between Kant´s critique of pure 
reason and Wittgenstein´s critique of language, which 
became current in analytic philosophy (Cf. e.g Hacker 
1972, 30.) seem not far-fetched in view of the impetus for 
the destruction of dogmatic metaphysics both philosophers 
share. Their relevance would gain though by an 
elaboration of their dissimilarities rather than by just 
stressing similarities.  
An example of the former approach, Weinert 
(1983, 412) contrasts the tools both critics of metaphysics 
employ: the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgments, and the description of the logic of language-
use and in particular the ´Argument from Epistemic 
Operators´ (Wittgenstein 1961, sects. 6.5, 6.51; 1958, §§ 
246, 247, 251, 303; references in the form of paragraph-
numbers are to the latter text) respectively. The analysis of 
the employment of those tools in anti-metaphysical 
arguments -and Weinert treats the Private Language 
Argument (PLA) as such (427-429)- enables to uncover  
underlying assumptions, e.g. the implicit assumption in 
Kant of a prior conceptual relation between concepts to 
which his notion of analysis is to be applied (430-431) and 
Wittgenstein´s explicit doctrine that “ordinary language is 
alright” (434).  
An example of the latter approach, Hacker 
suggests an outright similarity in scope of the PLA and  
those arguments:  
One can, without undue caricature, conceive of 
Wittgenstein's purpose in the private language argument 
as being an endeavour to extend and elaborate the 
Kantian dictum that intuitions without concepts are blind. 
(Hacker 1972, 216.) 
Due to its disregard of contextual differences, the 
illuminative value of that assessment is dubious. As 
Kitcher contends, those differences are so pervasive:  
that it is an interpretive and philosophical mistake 
to try to force an alliance between what are, in fact, deeply 
opposed camps. (...). (2000, 35.) 
And indeed, in what sense one could understand 
such a treatment of Kant´s dictum (see: 1990, B75) is 
unclear.  
Kitcher´s criticises the conflation of Kant´s 
transcendental ´I´ with Wittgenstein´s linguistic ´I´ that 
prevails in the “British tradition of Kant interpretation from 
Strawson on”, and mentions, among others, Hacker as a 
target (2000, 35). In this paper I extend Kitcher´s criticism 
to a ´Kantian´ reception of the PLA as a transcendental 
argument (TA), taking Hacker´s qualification as a starting 
point (section 2). Adopting Weinert’s approach, I will single 
out some characteristics of the PLA that suggest an 
‘unkantian’ reception. An assessment of its relevance can 
then be made. (Section 3). 
 
2 As a follow-up of Strawson´s (1959) and (1966), 
the debate on TA´s facilitated the reception the of the PLA 
as such an argument (Wilkerson 1975, 108; recently Stern 
1999, 3), thereby attributing to its Kantian flavour. For the 
Transcendental deduction (TD) of the categories and the 
Refutation of Idealism (RI) are generally regarded as 
models for TA´s (Brueckner 1983, 552; Stern 1999, 2).  
Under a general denomination, TA´s claim “that 
one thing (X) is a necessary condition for the possibility of 
something else (Y), so that (...) the latter cannot obtain 
without the former” (Stern 2000, 3; Wilkerson, 1975, 102). 
This does not mark off anything special about the 
argument itself, but only says something about the 
propositions it contains. (Gram, 1971, 15;  Grayling 1985, 
95.) Ample discussion has produced various distinctions 
between Kantian and revisionist accounts of TA´s (Stern 
1999, 9), concerning the nature of the subject matter of (Y) 
(1999, 3). In ´weaker´ TA´s (Y) stands for the necessary 
features of a conceptual scheme which makes possible a 
given structure of experience (Schaper 1972, 102). 
‘Weightier’ TA´s (Grayling, 1985, 83) establish necessary 
conditions for the possibility of experience (Stern 1999, 3). 
This distinction coincides with Kant´s between regressive 
and progressive arguments (1993, 26, n). The former can 
function in refutational arguments to demonstrate the 
incoherence of a sceptical claim with the necessary 
assumptions underlying that claim. (Kant 1990, A388-389.) 
Thus, in the RI, for example, it is argued from the 
assumption of empirical self-consciousness, the empirical 
´I´ of Descartes´ Cogito. (Kant 1990, B275), to the 
conditions of its possibility, outer objects. The latter argue 
from a principle to its principiatum. Thus, in the TD, it is 
argued from an a priori principle (the transcendental unity 
of the apperception, or transcendental ‘I’), concerning the 
subject of possible experience, the conditions of which it 
has to establish, to its principiatum, those conditions, i.e. 
the categories. Aschenberg (1982, 262, 284), regards only 
weightier TA´s as transcendental. They, like Kant´s TD, 
establish basic principles for a conceptual scheme “without 
which we could not think coherently about experience at 
all” (Schaper 1972, 102). Accordingly, Kantian would, for 
Brueckner, be the argument which shows that “the 
existence of physical objects of a general character is a 
condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience”, 
as he beliefs both the TD and RI do (1983, 552). Hintikka 
requires the conclusion of the Kantian variant to be an 
assertion concerning the epistemic proces involved (1972, 
275). This marks it of from any inference from a successful 
use of concepts a priori to its presuppositions and a fortiori 
from arguments which establish the logical presuppositions 
of something being the case, that Schaper reckons among 
the general variant (1972, 277, 101).  
This survey shows that the premises of a TA 
generally may contain synthetic and analytic, a priori and a 
posteriori, grammatical (Grayling 1985, 109) and empirical 
propositions. Consequently progressive as well as 
regressive arguments fall into its scope. Moreover, it 
shows that the genuine transcendentality of revisionist 
TA´s is controversial. Finally, that the dialectical distinction 
between the TD and the RI is often unaccounted for. In 
view of all this, a reception of the PLA as a TA seems 
unobvious. Besides, the use of the Argument from 
Epistemic Operators in the PLA to vitiate a private 
linguist´s claim concerning the epistemic privacy of 
sensations -e.g. §248 asserts the non-epistemic character 
of that claim- indicates already at the outset pace Hacker 
(1972, 271) the immoderation of a transcendental reading 
of the PLA, taking into account the primarily 
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epistemological connotation of ´transcendental´ (Kant 
1990, B25). Moreover, it turns out to be equivocal. 
This is illustrated by Hacker´s suggestion of a 
similarity between the PLA and the TD when he cites 
Kant´s emphasis on the necessary co-operation of the 
Understanding and Sensibility for the objective validity of 
judgments (1972, 216) on the one hand, and his 
suggestion of a similarity withe the RI when he presents 
the PLA as an argument demonstrating the incoherence of 
scepticism about the existence of the external world, on 
the other (215).  
If one would want to project the PLA on the 
Kantian models, the RI seems the most obvious candidate, 
judged by its dialectical similarity with the PLA, both being 
refutations of a sceptical claim. Even if the success of the 
PLA at refuting the private linguist can be contested (see: 
Stroud 2000, 78) it could be, in a qualification Bennett 
coined for the Kantian prototype (1966, 203), taken as a 
gesture towards such a refutation. Precisely due to this 
similarity however, the PLA as an undogmatic procedure, 
merely clarifies that the private linguist´s claim stems from 
an inconsistency in his use of words (cf. Glock, 1991, 85). 
As a refutation it would not entail the possibility of 
interpersonal communicability, let alone, by contraposition 
of its result, the claim that language is ´inevitably public´. 
Hintikka et al. notice that this claim is one of Wittgenstein´s 
basic assumptions but that he does not use it as a premise 
in the argument (1986, 261-262, 265). To his observation 
that his argument would “not be nearly as radical and as 
sweeping as it in reality” (264) if he nevertheless had done 
so has to be added that the refutational character of the 
PLA prevents such use.  
Due to its exclusive orientation on the logic of 
rules, the Kripkean PLA (Kripke 1982, passim) suggests 
that it were merely dealing with questions of interpersonal 
communicability of S-words. As §257 shows however, its 
greater import is that it deals with the logic of language-
games, that are constitutive for name-object relations and 
hence with the ´inevitably public´ nature of ´grammar.´ 
(Hintikka et al. 1986, 201, 262.) It remains to be seen 
whether the PLA purports to show the constitutive force of 
language-games. In view of this, it is questionable whether 
its projection on a Kantian TD-model, can convince of its 
radicality. For the PLA to be a deduction in an analogous 
Kantian sense it would have to be an argument that would 
establish a principle of significance (cf. Strawson 1966, 16) 
to warrant  the objective validity of the S-words the private 
linguist writes in her diary. This principle should obviate the 
appeal to a Restriktionsthese (cf. Prauss 1974, 174) for 
that would presuppose the adoption of transcendental 
idealism (cf. Aschenberg 1982, 61). Therefore, it should 
principiate the conditions that would make possible that the 
concepts falling under that principle, would exhaust the 
universe of sensible discourse, thus leaving no room for 
concepts that would be meaningful, without having 
objective reality blosse Gedankenformen (Kant 1990, 
B148). To paraphrase Strawson: if the private linguist 
would use a concept that would not fall within the scope of 
the principle, she would not merely be saying what she 
does not know, she would not really know what she were 
saying (1966, 16), and, one should add, she would “just 
emit an inarticulate sound” (§ 261). But, for all it does, the 
PLA is not concerned with a justification of the use of S-
words: §§267, 289. Wittgenstein´s descriptions of 
language-games in §§249, 261, 290, 293, 300 are not 
meant to be exhaustive; that would contradict the notion of 
language-game as part of a form of life (§23, cited in 
Hintikka et. Al. (1986, 218); cf. Stroud´s (2000, 78) reading 
of §258): the positive claims of the PLA are of a much 
more ´familiar´, even ´mundane´ nature. 
3 With all its incontestable exegetical merits, its 
equivocity corroborates an extension of Kitcher´s criticism 
to a projection of the PLA on a Kantian model. It is bound 
to oscillate between the contemporary aliases of the 
empirical ´I´ and the transcendental ´I´ thus leaving the 
status of the linguistic `I´ undecided. This approach would, 
anachronistically, allow of a reconstruction via Strawson of 
the PLA as a TD and vice versa, as is offered in Stevenson 
(1982, 334). Rorty´s appreciation of “Strawson's only good 
transcendental argument for the 'necessary' character of 
material object concepts”, i.e. their TD in his (1959), as a 
PLA (1971,13), and Bennett´s rephrasing of the RI as a 
´realism argument´ for the claim that selfconsciousness 
requires outer experience, the PLA being a version of that 
argument (1966, 203 ff.), may serve as further illustrations 
of the systematic intricacies of this approach. 
Its preoccupation with subjectivity and reciprocally, 
with its objective counterpart forms an implicit plea for 
postneokantianism. To use a Kuhnian, obviously un-
Wittgensteinian concept, that move would be a regression. 
For, unlike Kant, the PLA does neither deal with Cartesian 
metaphysics (Hintikka et al. 1986, 250) nor with Cartesian 
epistemology. It rather shows e.g. in §§269, 278 the 
redundancy of the ´transcendental´ subject, as well as of 
the metaphysical private object, sensation, most 
notoriously in §§272, 293 and 299.   
By contrast, Weinert´s observation in Wittgenstein 
of a trend towards expliciteness (1983, 423, 434-435) 
indicates a progressive problemshift. As such the 
emergence of a sharper awareness of the linguistic 
counterpart of the Paradox of Transcendental Knowledge, 
the intrinsic link between the unknowability of things 
considered independently of our epistemic procedures and 
the conceptual framework they utilize, and their 
unknowability, is also noteworthy. Wittgenstein´s 
awareness of this latter paradox, the mutual dependence 
of linguistic relativity and the ineffability of semantics 
(Hintikka et al. 1986, 5, is expressed in his calling the 
sensation itself “not a something, but not a nothing either!” 
(§304). Wittgenstein does not merely offer a Kripkean 
sceptical solution (1982, 95) for this paradox. Instead, he 
proposes a ‘radical break’ with the idea that language 
always functions as a means to convey thoughts. More 
than welcoming Kant´s ´cognitive theoretical analyses´ to 
give direction to cognitive sciences, as Kitcher proposes 
(2000, 61), contemporary philosophers should study the 
consequences of this break.     
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